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Is It Time for India’s Rocket 
Force?
Bimal Monga
Lacking conventionally armed, ground-launched missiles with which 
to attack enemy forces, or sufficient defences against China or Russia’s 
conventionally armed, ground-launched missiles, American forces 
routinely lose war game simulations involving China and Russia, and 
could very well lose a real war.
—Timothy A. Walton, 20191
Introduction
The future battlefield is likely to be largely contactless where unmanned 
warfare, stand-off weapons and cyber and clandestine operations will take 
precedence over tank vs. tank or hand-to-hand combat. Towards this effort 
all major countries are creating assets and organisations to consolidate their 
space assets, galvanise capabilities in cyber domain, pr vide a new edge to 
their special forces and fine-tune their hybrid warfare options. However 
an equally important focus has been on boosting missile inventories and 
redefining its employment philosophy. Over the years there has been an 
alarming proliferation of missiles all across the globe, as the technology to 
build them has became increasingly prosaic; today 31 countries are known 
to be in possession of ballistic missiles.2 It is not without a reason that Ian 
Williams, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
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(CSIS) feels that “… we are entering an era of missile renaissance.”3 The 
missiles, today, are being increasingly envisioned for conventional use, 
leading to a serious rethinking on their employment. This, to a great 
extent, has been precipitated by China, who stole a march over the USA 
and Russia, by building her capacities and capabilities in rocketry—quietly, 
efficiently and surreptitiously, while both these powers were bound by 
the stringent provisions of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(INFT) for over three decades. The breakdown of the INFT has given 
an impetus to the missile rivalry between the USA, Russia and China; 
inadvertently pushing many middle-level powers also into a new missile 
race. A matter of concern, to the world in general and India and the USA 
in particular, has been the phenomenal rise of China’s People’s Liberation 
Army Rocket Force (PLARF), whose burgeoning inventory of missiles, 
and their intended use, both in the strategic and conventional domains, 
has made the world take notice and weigh their options. 
PLARF
I am not interested in nuclear weapons. They are not something to use. 
The more there are, the harder it will be for nuclear wars to break out. If a 
war breaks out, it will be a war of conventional weapons. If conventional 
weapons are used, the art of war, such as strategies and tactics, can be 
emphasized and commanders can change plans to suit the situation ...
—Mao Zedong4
Chinese missile forces, which were under the command of the Second 
Artillery Force/Corps, have changed conspicuously in character over 
the last three decades; it has evolved into the potent PLA Rocket Force 
(PLARF) and elevated to the fourth military service. PLARF is today 
assessed to have approximately 2,500 ballistic missiles5 in its inventory, 
and is designed to undertake two major types of warfighting campaigns: 
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the nuclear counter-attack campaign and the conventional missile strike 
campaign—to ensure strategic deterrence and conduct precision strikes.6 
Importantly, while a number of countries maintained strategic assets 
as a means of deterrence or coercion, China introduced a new dimension 
to the matrix by deploying conventional missiles alongside the nuclear; 
embracing the idea that it would fight future wars, where the line dividing 
nuclear and non-nuclear operations would be blurred. More than half 
of the Rocket Force is, therefore, deployed to carry conventional loads 
to “conduct medium and long range precision strikes” jointly with air 
power against “key strategic and operational targets,” such as command 
and control facilities, communications and transportation nodes, air and 
missile defences, and airbases.7 According to the US Department of 
Defense, the Rocket Force deploys DF-16 missiles with a range of about 
800–1,000 km, DF-21 MRBMs, and the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic 
missile, in conventional role. In addition, it deploys about 1,200 short-
range ballistic missiles and a number of CJ-10 ground-launched cruise 
missiles with a range of about 1,500 km8 (Table 1).








CEP(m) Number of Inventory
1996 2003 2010 2017
SRBMs
DF-11 280-350 500-800 500-600 Small 
Number
175 700-750 1,200
DF-11A 350 500 20-30
DF-15 600 500 300 Small 
Number
160 350-400
DF-15A 600 600 30
DF-15B 600-800 600 5
MRBMs
Df-21C 2,500 500 50 0 0 36-72 108-174
Df-163 800-
1,000
? ? 0 0 0
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400 5-20 0 0 200-500 450-
1,250
ALCM 3,300 400 5-20 0 0 In 
inventory
Source: Compiled from Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems Data IISS, The Military Balance 1996, 
2003, 2010 and 2015; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress, 
Military and Security Democracy Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Washington, D.C., 
2010 and 2014. 
PLA publications have repeatedly underscored the centrality of 
conventional missile attacks in joint operations aimed at achieving 
information dominance, air superiority, and sea control, as well as 
countering third-party intervention. The conventional missile force will be 
used against high-threat and high-value targets, either as an independent 
conventional missile strike campaign or as a key part of joint campaign 
involving other services.9 
The philosophy and concept of employment of missiles by China, 
coupled with its ambiguous No First Use (NFU) policy, has thus upset 
the predictability of missile deterrence and triggered a re-assessment of 
options by major powers.
Impact on the USA
We can’t afford a force structure composed of a small number of silver bullets. 
It makes good sense to pursue a variety of delivery systems, trajectories, ranges, 
velocities, propulsion types and basing domains to support broad defense and 
deterrence goals; the future strike will almost surely include a mix of UAVs, 
cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles …
—Tom Karako, CSIS, 2019 
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Under the Strategic Command (STRATCOM), ballistic missiles have 
served as the backbone of the US strategic nuclear deterrence since the 
late 1950s. The Bush Administration, in the Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) 2001, for the first time called for the integration of precision 
conventional weapons with strategic nuclear forces in a new category 
of “offensive strike weapons.” The Obama Administration, in the 2010 
NPR, further stated that the Pentagon “is studying the appropriate mix 
of long-range strike capabilities, including heavy bombers as well as non-
nuclear Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)…”.10 During the 
latter years of the Obama Administration and early years of the Trump 
Administration, the United States expanded the scope of this research 
and development programmes into hypersonic capabilities.11 These 
initiatives are consistent with an expanded rationale for long-range 
conventional strike weapons, in general, and hypersonic weapons, in 
particular. Michael Griffin, the Under Secretary of the US Defense for 
Research and Engineering, feels that while hypersonic weapons would 
serve as tactical, rather than strategic assets,12 the Conventional Prompt 
Global Strike (CPGS) weapons would allow the US to strike anywhere 
on earth with conventional warheads, in as little as an hour; CPGS 
weapons, however, would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would 
supplement its conventional capabilities. Further the increase in funding 
for Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) Programme, from around 
US$ 278 million in FY2019 to US$ 593 million in FY2020, is a reflection 
of the growing priority and interest of the US in moving the programme 
towards deployment.13
It is not that conventional missiles are new to USA, their destructive 
potential has been demonstrated earlier during the Gulf War, in 
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya; however, this programme 
in recent times, to an extent, has been dictated by the potential of 
PLARF, whose missiles are today capable of targeting ships both at sea 
and bases ashore, not only in Asia (and India), but also far out at sea, 
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including the American mainland, Alaska, Guam and the Northern 
Marianas. Since the end of the Cold War, the US Navy had employed 
its aircraft carriers to bludgeon weaker enemies, by floating close to 
their shores to launch air strikes, confident that their warships were 
invulnerable. However, the PLARF missiles have proved to be a game 
changer and a great leveller in the power equation; the US now fears 
that the Chinese will employ swarms of cheap, expendable missiles 
which have the capability to neutralise their most sophisticated 
warships; this would not only erode the superiority enjoyed by the 
US, but also signal a return to highly contested warfare at sea.14 
Thus, there has been a growing realisation in the US, that:
absence of effective conventionally armed, ground-launched missiles 
with which to attack enemy, or sufficient defenses against China or 
Russia’s conventionally armed, ground-launched missiles, American 
forces routinely lose war game simulations involving China and Russia 
and could very well lose a real war.15 
Impact on India
The sustained growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and missile inventory, 
plus China’s modernization of its nuclear forces and both nuclear and 
conventional missiles, presents an unprecedented complication for India’s 
security.
—Vinash Patel, 201316
The Chinese primarily built its missile capability with an eye on the USA 
and Russia, but now has an intrinsic capability to use them against India 
too; and by all accounts this undeniably forms part of the Chinese calculus. 
India thus requires to seriously weigh its response options (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Comparison between Chinese and India Missiles
 
       China’s Ballistic Missiles17  India’s Missiles
Source: Compiled from www.india.com 
However, China’s short, medium and intermediate range conventional 
missiles have the entire country and the seas beyond within striking range; 
and India has no answers to this threat, at present. The Chinese philosophy 
of warfighting propagates engaging the enemy initially in the cyber, space 
and information domain followed by (or concurrently) with an intense 
conventional Rocket Force campaign, to break the adversaries will to 
fight, right at the outset. While India has initiated some incremental steps 
in addressing and building capacities for warfighting in space, cyber and 
the clandestine/special forces domain, it is yet to come up with concrete 
measures or proposals to counter the conventional might of the PLARF.
The progressively precise PLARF missiles are capable of partially 
paralysing and disrupting our critical military and civil infrastructure at 
the very onset of a conflict, while ensuring that the engagement is kept 
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below the nuclear threshold; this indeed is a worrisome prospect for 
India. The omnipresent threat of Chinese conventional missiles is in itself 
coercive, during normal times; and if a war does break out, it can cause 
unacceptable damage and casualties. It goes without saying, that our 
existing missiles too can be used in conventional role; this however will 
require a concerted effort in terms of committing resources and building 
capacities, which is being discussed subsequently. 
Imagine a scenario, where China launches an offensive, preceded by 
an intense missile campaign, targeting and crippling vital military and civil 
infrastructure, thereby causing widespread destruction, loss of morale and 
shaping of public opinion against the government. What are the response 
options available with India? Air strikes? Naval action or blockade? 
Ground action to capture shallow objectives? Defensive measures over a 
wide canvas? Diplomatic outreach? Maybe, all of the above. Thus a missile 
campaign, much expected and in tune with the Chinese warfighting 
philosophy, will invite a whole of nation (and armed forces) response 
right at the outset, which however, may still be ineffectual, and come 
with an attendant risk of escalating the situation. Now analyse the same 
scenario, if we had own credible conventional missile inventory? Would 
the Chinese still target us with missiles, fully aware that it may invite a 
similar and swift riposte?
So what are the options with India? Accept the inevitable and be 
resigned to live and fight in the shadow of conventional missile strikes, or 
initiate measures to safeguard own interests…
Options for India
Indian capital New Delhi is only 400 km away from Tibet; and from 
Indian borders to Beijing the distance is around 4000 km. PLA also 
holds credible missile defense capabilities, and it is perfectly capable of 
intercepting Agni V striking important targets in China. China’s short 
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range tactical missiles can also constitute a sizable threat to India. If India 
wants to challenge China, India has to deploy several expensive ICBMs, 
which definitely will be a drag on Indian economy.
 —Chinese Strategic Analysts18
While India has articulated a nuclear (and NFU) policy and raised a robust 
SFC, the options to build capabilities to counter conventional missiles 
requires serious deliberations.
It goes without saying that defensive measures like camouflage, 
concealment, decoys, dispersion, duplication of critical assets, hardening 
of defences and air raids are inherent to any countermeasure; India, 
however, has primarily two broad options to negate, reduce or counter 
the impact of PLARF.
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)
Missile strikes on air bases would be part of opening salvos of a war by 
China.
—Connor O’ Sean19
The decision to go in for a ballistic missile defence, to shield ourselves 
from the adversaries to the North and West, is not an easy one. 
Conceptual opposition to BMD principally revolves around the idea that 
a missile shield emboldens the s ielded state to take offensive actions on 
the false assumption that it is completely invulnerable to any retaliation.20 
A number of other pertinent questions too persist. Do we plan for a 
“Country Wide Deployment” or a “Limited Deployment”? Will Missile 
Defence upset the stabilising, mutual vulnerability balance, by making 
the effectiveness of a first strike uncertain? Will this spur the adversaries 
to develop larger arsenals, better technologies, penetration devices and 
countermeasures to thwart our BMD system? 
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And most importantly, does the astronomical cost and unproven 
technology warrant this endeavour? It is argued that even a successful Missile 
Defence System can never guarantee a 100 percent interception rate and 
the astronomical costs are prohibitive. As an example, the US continental 
system is estimated to have cost about US$ 100 billion from 2002 till date; 
and though a pan-India system will cost much less, assessed to be anything 
between Rs. 50,000 crore to a staggering Rs. 250,000 crore, it will however 
still be unable to guarantee complete protection.21 Limited and denser BMD 
deployment to cover important cities, economic centres and vital military 
and civil infrastructure may therefore be a better option.
Ballistic Missile Defence is thus one of the means, but not the only or 
the best way, to respond to the PLARF threat. A proactive strategy may 
therefore be more effective.
Develop Own Conventional Missiles
… global (missile) strike capability involves much more than just the delivery 
of a weapon to a target; it encompasses both the ability to plan rapidly, 
to apply the precision to the intelligence and gather that intelligence in a 
very rapid manner, and then to apply that intelligence to the target and 
understand the effect we want to create.
 —General Cartwright, Commander STRATCOM 200722
It is widely accepted that a limited and state-of-the-art inventory of ballistic 
missiles, expensive but difficult to intercept, must be optimally employed 
as a first salvo, to punch holes in the adversaries’ defence; a follow-up 
strike by a large number of cheaper cruise missiles, can thereafter, create 
opportunities for both ground and air forces to exploit and produce 
disproportionately effective results, both in terms of casualties and time. 
Moreover, precision missiles are considered a particularly useful 
capability for a weaker nation to deter and create an element of doubt 
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for a larger and more powerful nation. The potential of conventional 
ballistic missiles, as a tool for signalling, diplomacy, propaganda, 
deterrence and retaliation, was validated in Iran’s response to the US 
killing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Force Commander, Qasem 
Soleimani, in January 2020. The precise targeting, which prevented 
casualties to the US military personnel, not only confirmed the efficacy 
of Iran’s conventional missile capabilities, but also reinforced the view 
that missiles can be effectively used by a weaker nation to achieve the 
desired strategic aim; and contrary to popular belief, also for averting 
further escalation.
 India possesses a good expertise in the field of missiles and a 
dissuasive to credible strategic deterrence is already in place. However, 
at the same time, there exists no capacity or strategy to deter China from 
using conventional missiles against us. It is therefore imperative that India 
explores building alternative capacities, including inducting conventional 
ballistic missiles, to obviate being held hostage to the threat of long-range 
precision strikes by PLARF.
Table 2: China and India’s Land Based Strategic Ballistic Missiles
Source: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, vol. 71, no. 5, 79. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00963402 
15599788?needAccess=true; (December 7, 2019).23
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Towards this endeavour, India has the twin advantage of a 
relatively advanced expertise in the field of missile technology and a 
predominantly indigenous production line. However the decision to 
go in for conventional missiles is not going to be easy, it will require 
rigorous operational analysis, a critical cost-benefit appraisal and most 
importantly, immense political dexterity; it will also come with its own 
share of challenges—much more demanding, elaborate and complex, 
than just screwing conventional warheads in place of nuclear ones. An 
entire ecosystem, interrelated capabilities and checks and balances, will 
have to be built on or independent of the existing strategic infrastructure, 
to support induction and employment of conventional missiles. Some 
important and inescapable prerequisites will be: 
  Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR): There 
is a requirement to improve our real-time surveillance and target 
acquisition capabilities to enable quick and precise engagement 
of targets, ensure effective Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and 
follow-up strike capability.
  Missiles: Increased precision/accuracy (smaller CEP), improved 
navigation system, different ranges, a rapid launch capability and 
survivability are a must for conventional missiles. According to 
the Chinese military expert Ge Lide, India presently faces many 
technological difficulties, especially in developing solid- propellant 
rocket engine and inertial navigation components. In the field of 
high- performance and high-precision “Inertial Navigation Systems” 
India does not have independent capabilities. Till the time these 
technical capabilities are developed Indian missiles’ ranges and 
kinematic accuracy will be negatively impacted.24
  Architecture: The envisaged Force’s architecture, including an 
efficient Command and Control organisation, doctrine and tactics 
will require deep analysis and formulation. 
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  Logistics: Life of missiles and warheads, their maintenance, storage 
and movement warrants special attention.
  De-risk: Measures to reduce confusion between launch of a 
conventional and nuclear missile will have to be instituted.
  Re-articulation of Nuclear Policy/NFU?
Sceptics may argue that such an initiative by India may lead to a 
missile race in the region with Pakistan joining in to counter India with its 
own conventional missile force. However, this argument may be flawed, 
as we do not require to launch conventional missiles to target Pakistan, 
as our Lenticular Re-entry Vehicle (LRVs) and aircraft are sufficient to 
cover the requisite frontage and shallow depth of Pakistan; launch of 
a missile towards the west would only be a riposte to a strategic or a 
conventional strike by Pakistan; this fact is well understood and could be 
publicly reiterated. 
Another red flag by the naysayers could be—that our adversaries 
may not be able to distinguish between the launch of a conventional 
and a nuclear missile; this has the potential to result in an accidental 
or inadvertent nuclear exchange. But the same logic is applicable to 
China, who has already mixed two warheads with impunity, fully aware 
of the attendant nuclear escalatory risk. But will nuclear escalation 
be immediate? A targeted country is unlikely to instinctively assume 
that a missile launched is nuclear tipped or for a disarming attack and 
immediately go in for a nuclear ip ste; the stakes for any nation are 
simply too high. It is more likely that a country will absorb the first strike, 
rule out a worst-case scenario and then retaliate proportionately. A well 
articulated nuclear policy emphasising on NFU, along with a policy on 
employment of conventional missiles, with sufficient checks and balances 
in place, should put to rest such assumptions and fears.
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Benefit and Risk Analysis
In the China-India context, respect for capabilities enhances the chances of 
engaging each other in negotiations. 
—Lora Saalman, 201325
Induction of conventional missiles will add a complementary capability 
and augment India’s conventional strike prowess; further, if appropriately 
postured, it will minimise our vulnerability to an attack. At the same time 
attendant risks are the same that any country fielding a conventional 
missile faces. It is finally for the policy and decision makers to judge 
whether the escalatory risks due to land-based missiles will outweigh their 
strategic and operational benefits. 
Benefits: Developing a conventional missile capability will accrue 
some of the benefits listed below. 
  Deter China from using/threatening India with its conventional 
missiles.
  Provide an option to use this potent capability to cause damage/
destruction in event of an all-out conflict.
  Impose “caution and cost” of developing countermeasures on 
adversaries.
  Suppress Chinese airbases, target missile launch sites and Transporter-
Erector-Launchers (TELs) and interdict communication arteries.
  Ability to acquire and engage opportunity and fleeting targets.
  Conventional missiles require a high state of readiness and reliability 
(exceeding 90 per cent); they thus will be able to respond promptly 
after a decision to launch is taken.
  It would not only lead to developing capabilities required for future 
wars, which are likely to manifest primarily in the non-contact domain, 
but also send across an important signal of capability and resolve to 
the adversary.
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Risks: A slew of measures will require to be instituted to significantly 
pare the risks.
  Enunciating a well-formulated policy on employment of conventional 
missiles.
  No country would use nuclear missiles as a means of war initiation; 
nuclear weapons, if used, would be for war termination by a 
desperate country at the cusp of defeat. Therefore, though the 
inability to distinguish between a nuclear or conventional missile 
is a very important concern and risk, any missile launched cannot 
be assumed to be a nuclear missile, without positive identification. 
However, some measures being discussed by experts to mitigate 
this risk include:26
m High-level and continuous military-to-military and political 
contact, consultations and discussions to keep adversaries 
informed about the observable and distinguishing differences 
between conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles.
m Deploying conventional missiles on mobile launchers, horizontally 
in earthen berms, or above the ground, rather than in hardened, 
vertical silos used at nuclear missile bases. 
m Altering or depressing the trajectory of ballistic missiles armed 
with conventional warheads so that they do not mirror the 
trajectories followed by nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. 
  Another destabilising concern is the inability to reassure adversaries 
that such missiles will not t reaten or target nuclear forces, as this 
may invite a strategic response.
  Though conventional missiles contribute towards conventional 
deterrence, it however tends to be more dynamic than nuclear 
deterrence as the potency of conventional weapons is much lesser 
than that of nuclear weapons. It has been assessed that a small force 
of conventional missiles is not powerful enough to pose a credible 
conventional deterrence.27
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  Building of conventional missile capacities and capabilities is an 
expensive endeavour; it will be taxing and financially draining to 
maintain such a force, that too in a continuous state of high readiness. 
Moreover, ballistic missiles are an expensive system to deliver high 
explosives. During extended and high-intensity wars, it may be cost-
prohibitive to rely exclusively on such expendable missiles rather than 
on reusable delivery means like aircraft. Rough studies have shown 
that even a high rate of aircraft attrition, of say 5 per cent, i.e., one 
aircraft lost in twenty sorties, is not sufficient to make the use of 
ballistic missiles a cost-effective proposition, for conventional deep-
strike missions.28 However, if a number of fixed targets are to be 
addressed concurrently over a short span of time, ballistic missiles 
armed with potent payloads, is an effective choice.
  Lastly, as discussed earlier, it may lead to a missile race in the region 
with Pakistan too joining in; but then, does not Pakistan, by proxy, 
already have this capability available on a platter?
Prognosis
India requires developing new operational concepts and capabilities, 
in tune with assessed future wars. To counter the PLARF (and other 
adversaries’ missiles), we must go in for a limited BMD, to cover important 
cities, command and control, and economic centres, critical infrastructure 
and strategic assets; concurrently steps to develop capacities facilitating 
induction of conventional missiles int  our inventory, is a must. Strategic, 
political and financial considerations will dictate the architecture and scale 
of such a conventional missile force. The decision whether the missiles 
will be incorporated into the existing SFC structure or in a stand-alone 
configuration, or as part of any other service or arm, is secondary and 
presently infructuous. Measures to obviate the identified risks should 
form part of a well-articulated conventional missile employment policy, 
concomitantly with a review of Nuclear (and NFU) Policy. Denial and 
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deception measures like hardening of defences and storages, dispersing 
and duplicating critical assets, to make it difficult for the adversary to 
locate and strike key platforms, is a continuous and ongoing process, and 
must be persisted with.
Conclusion
Deterrence is simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or 
risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.
—Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke29
India has been a silent neighbour, observing with concern the pace, alacrity 
and aggression with which the Chinese armed forces have modernised 
and reorganised. We, however, do not require to mirror or react to all the 
Chinese military developments, as this would just push us into an “excessive 
spending and spreading thin” trap; what is required is a prudent and long-
term vision to build capacities and capabilities in tune with assessed future 
warfighting by our adversaries. While India has initiated some measures to 
keep pace with the changing environmental realities, there have been no 
concrete steps to counter the formidable capabilities or coercive signalling 
and intimidation inherent to PLARF. Developing conventional missiles is 
not an all-encompassing panacea, but one of the many military instruments 
and options to coun er PLARF and prepare for future wars. The long 
fructification period to raise such a force with the desired capabilities and 
characteristics necessitates a well-informed but a prompt decision by the 
policymakers keeping in mind the security of the country. 
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